University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive

OSSA 8

Jun 3rd, 9:00 AM - Jun 6th, 5:00 PM

Commentary on Moldovan
Jim Gough

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Gough, Jim, "Commentary on Moldovan" (2009). OSSA Conference Archive. 109.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA8/papersandcommentaries/109

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Commentary on Andrei Moldovan’s “Pragmatic Considerations in
the Interpretation of Denying the Antecedent”
JIM GOUGH
Department of Philosophy
Red Deer College
Red Deer, Alberta
Canada
jim.gough@rdc.ab.ca

1. INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of the paper, the author claims that he is concerned with the “analysis of
fragments of discourse or text” which “contain deductive arguments suspected of being
denials of the antecedent” (1). However, it is not clear how he gets from a fragment of
discourse to an argument, eliminating an explanation and description as possibilities. If
we accept that this could be done, then we can accept that the initial move is from a
fragment of discourse to how to reconstruct a deductive argument, from what is initially
an invalid form, denying the antecedent, to a valid structure. This is done by using the
Gricean notion of implicature where a speaker infers from (a) “what is said” or literally
expressed to (b) “what is meant”-by the speaker of the argument in context. Evaluative
use is made of conventional maxims of rational and cooperative behaviour. Interpreters
of fragments must be “intuitive hypothesis formulators” in order to correctly identify the
speaker/arguer’s intended meaning. So, the set of propositions that constitute any
argument can be structured as (a) argument-w or (b) argument-m, and (b) can be
discovered from a linguistic phenomena identified as “conditional perfection” which
involves a “pragmatic strengthening of the content of the utterance.” So, “if I finish my
homework, my dad will let me play basketball” is interpreted not as an “if” conditional
but an “iff” conditional.
The main issue is not one of logical structure and how to reconstruct a valid
argument from an invalid one but rather the prior critical question of translation from: (i)
fragment to argument, (ii) fragment to deductive argument, (iii) fragment to valid
argument, and (iv) conditional “if” to the material conditional, “iff,” which is central to
the reconstruction working.
2. TRANSLATION IS NOT ARGUMENTATION
There is an assumption that if I can provide an adequate translation of your claims, x, into
my version, y, then this provides an argument that x is, in some relevant respect(s),
equivalent to y. But what is the controversial claim? It isn’t about the translation because
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the translation is an explanation of how something can be done or accomplished, not a
justification. Where is the argument? What is the controversy? Implicit in this context,
there must be assumed to be a counter argument, something to the effect that: x is not
identical to, synonymous or translatable into y? What are the premises in support of this
counter argument? Is there some claim like P: It is possible to translate x into y? But
notice, to translate is not necessarily to give a reason or an argument/justification , but
rather an explanation of how x is identical to or can be converted or reformulated or
reconsidered as y. For example when I translate “dog” into French as “chien” all I hope
to do is to capture roughly synonymous meaning in an explanation of how the two terms
work, not argue that one must be identified with the other or vice versa. I am merely
claiming that the first term in one language works like the second term in another
language. There is nothing—on the face of it—controversial here, so nothing to argue
about. Hence, this transfer of x into y is an explanation, not an argument by intention not
by accident.
It could only become an argument if one considered, and—for good reasons—the
need to justify a rejection of the counter claim that: x is not equivalent to or cannot be
translated as or re-presented as y, in some relevant respects. If I, for example,
demonstrate that x is isomorphic with y, then this demonstration shows something about
the relationship between x and y but it is not necessarily an argument. So, the crux of any
argument for a translation, like an explanation, comes about in the circumstances when
someone denies that the explanation of the relationship between x and y holds. This
means that the argument is about the best explanation to account for the best translation.
When there are two domains of expertise or knowledge, practices and procedures,
claims made in one domain do not automatically transfer into another domain. So, for
example, if I can translate some psychological discoveries into mathematical notation or
formal notation, it doesn’t follow that I have completely, without any loose ends (of
dangling data or homunculi or qualia), left over after the translation of psychology into
mathematics. Attempts in the 1960’s to formulate the laws of a unified science of physics
seemed to have failed because there were such loose ends defying attempts at amorphous
completion.
However, the world that psychology considers is necessarily ambiguous between
at least two open possibilities; otherwise the process of discovering which of the two
holds: women are superior intellectually to men or men are superior intellectually to
women, and so on, would be otiose. However, in the case of mathematics, there is no
ambiguity assumed, let alone necessary, to get the process of discovery going. Instead
there is an assumption about formal or analytic certainty, which is not ambiguous;
ambiguities need to be eliminated, not explained or accounted for on the basis of
empirical experimentation, as in the case of psychology. This is just a commonplace
distinction between an empirical science and a formal science. However, the implication
to conditional perfection, which looks like something that could be an empirical
discovery of science, is not a linguistic phenomena but instead “Gricean accounts of
implicatures are not psychological hypothesis, so they are not explanations of all
tendencies to perfect conditionals” (p. 8). They are tendencies that invite intuitive rational
reconstructions, which make it sound like they are logical tendencies implicit in the body
of language users who seem to want to avoid “fallacy attribution.” (p. 8)
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3. CONCLUSION
Suppose that the general population surveyed by a questionnaire indicates pretty
uniformly that they interpret the meaning of the logical operator “if” as “iff” in a stronger
sense than some logicians think it should be understood, then what? What questions or
issues does this suggest? First, perhaps the ordinary language user cannot understand the
logician’s sense of “if” and can only understand the logician’s sense of “iff” as “if.” That
is, perhaps the ordinary language user cannot make the logician’s distinction because the
context of his or her understanding is different. So, the ordinary language user doesn’t
know that he is translating from one logically meaning of “if” to another meaning of “if”
as “iff” since this language user is not aware of any contrasting difference. This is a
logician-speaker/hearer-ordinary language user dichotomy of intentional difference. As
one writer notes: “Translatability of a sentence requires only that its cognitive meaning be
reproducible, if it has one; it does not require that its effects on a hearer or reader be
reproducible as well.” (Marhenke, p. 144) The problem is about what the hearer or reader
believes about a claim when it is formulated as a conditional and whether this is identical
with the intention of the writer or logician. Moldovan claims that either the hearer
correctly identifies the “iff” as “if” or she is confused about what the sentence “If I finish
my homework, my dad will let me play basketball” means, since if there were any other
conditions intended as sufficient conditions then the speaker “is expected to have
mentioned them” based on following a “submaxim of Quantity” (p. 7). But this is a
different implication based not on what is conditionally implied by the context to what is
necessary, following implicature. This is not about speaker intention but logical
necessity. Why should we expect an ordinary language user to understand this
distinction? What is the psychological research that supports this claim?
Second, perhaps there is no “if” conditional relationship in the reader/hearer’s
mind at all and all such instances are really missing a central component that would
identify them all as material conditionals. Then the speaker does not understand what is
“the rational thing to do”? How do we correct this?
Third, the hearer/reader may simply mis-understand the translation of the
argument by changing “if” to “iff” while not understanding the logical significance of
this change, or at least not understand it as the logician does as the conditions a sentence
in standard logical form must satisfy. In this case, there is an ambiguity between the
speaker’s intended meaning and the hearer’s understanding of the speaker’s intended
meaning. This ambiguity (or equivocation) is attributable to a difference in context and
abilities between the logician and the ordinary language user, a difference that seems not
possible on the analysis of fragments in this paper.
Link to paper
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